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I. IntroductIOn 
Large corporatIOns tYPically obtam cred,t m the 
pubhc debt markets, whIle small firms usually 
must depend on financlallOtermedlanes, particu-
larly commercIal banks Given that asymmetnc 
mformatlon problems tend to be much morc 
aCllte m small firms than m large firms, It IS not 
surpmmg that the ways m whIch these respec-
tIve groups obtaIn creda financmg dIffer slgmfi-
cantly Bank financmg often mvolves a long-term 
relatIOnship that may help altenuate these Infor-
matIon problems, whereas pubhc debt finanCIng 
generally does not have thIS feature 
Banks solve these asymmetnc InformatIOn 
problems by producmg and analyzmg mforma-
tlOn and by sellIng loan contract terms, such as 
the mterest rate charged or the collateral re-
qlllred, to Improve borrower mcentlve~ The 
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[hi" artIcle exammes 
the role of reiahonship 
lcndtng In ,mail firm fi-
nance It exammes 
pnce and nonpnce 
term" of bank hne, of 
cred,t (Lies) extended 
to ,mall firm" The fo-
eu\ on Lie" dllows the 
examInatIOn of a type 
of loan contract m 
whIch the bank-
borrower relatlOo<;hlP 
IS lIkely to be dO Impor-
tdnt mecham"ffi for 
solvmg the d~ymmetnc 
mformatlon problem" 
associated WIth findnc-
mg small enterpfl<;cs 
We find that borrower" 
WIth longer bankmg re-
IdtlOnshIp, PdY lower 
mtere~t rates and are 
Ie" lIkely to pledge col-
lateral fhese re'iults 
are con'ilstent wlth the-
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bank-borrower relatIOnshIp may pldY d SlgmfiLdot lole In thl.., procc'-l'" 
of gathenng mformatlOn and setlJ/lg the tel m, of the loan conti art 
Banks mdY acqUire private mfOrm:ltlOn over the COU[":!c of a relatIOn-
shIp and use thIs mformatIon to refine the contract terms offered to the 
borrower OUi emplflcal dnaJY~ls u~e~ data on IOem rate., dnd col1aterdl 
reqmremcnh on hnes of credIt (LlCs) Issued to small hu"ne"es, thiS 
allows us to test the jomt hypothesIs that bdnks gam mformatlon a, 
the bank-borrower rcldtton~hlp progrc~..,es and llSC thl~ mformatlOn to 
adjust the contract terms 
ThIS analysIs IS mottvated by theones of fin,mcldl mtermedlatlon 
that emphaSIze the mformatlOn ad,antages of banks (e g , DIamond 
1984,1991, Ramaknshnan and Thakor 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986) 
Rccently, a theoretIcal hterature on relationshIp lendmg has appe.lred 
that provJde~ predlctlOn~ ahout how loan mtcre.;;t I <lte5 evolve over 
the course of a bank-borrower rcidtlonshlP The ,}Iodels of Petersen 
and Raja1J (1993) and Boot and lhakor (1994) predIct that lOan mterest 
rates should deehne dS a relatIOnship matures, whIle thr model<, of 
Greenbaum, Kanatas, and YeneLl" (1989), Shdfpc (1990), and Wilson 
(1993) predIct mcrease, m rate' ovcr lIme B00t and Thakor's model 
also predlcb that collateral reqUirements on loan' Will he lower the 
longer a borrower ha, had a relalJonshlp With d partIcular lender The 
maIn purpose of thIS article J ... to prOVIde emplflLal te ... t~ of these theo-
retical predIctIOns u:-"lOg an extensive data 'let on ... mall fi1 m finance 
Two strands of the itteraturc have proVided some emp,ncal eVIdence 
on the value of bank-borrower relationshIp, [n the fi"t 'trand, studIes 
of "bank umqueness" addre"ed the que,uon of whethel banks pro-
duce valudble pnvate mformatlOn about bOI rower., (e g , J allie, 1987, 
Lummer and McConnell 1989, Ho,hl, Kashyap and Schdrhtem 
1990(/, 1990b, James and WeIr 1990, Wamley, Eldyan, and Collm' 
1992, Shockley and Thakor 1993, Kwan 1994, BIllel!, Flannery, dnd 
Garfinkel 1995) Among othel thmgs, these studle' proVIded eVIdence 
that the eXIstence of a bank-borrower rciatlon ... hlp mCicasc'. firm vdlue 
Some of these studIes .lIsa mdlrectly pro .'Ided eVIdence aloollt the 
value of the ;frength of a bank-borrower relatton,hlp They found 
that announcements of lcncwah of eXI~tmg bdflk Lie ... oftUt genC!dte 
glcdter abnormal market return ... than do dnnOUnCf'ment~ of neWly 1"1-
sued LlCs 
The second ,trand of the empmcal relationship lendIng itterdture 
proVIded more dIrect test' of th" strength of the bdllk-bonowCf ,ola-
tranship (Petersen and Rdjan 1991, 1994) These studies used d contlOu-
ous med"iUre of the <;trcngth of the bdnk-hOiloWCI re1atlpn<;hlp-lh 
durdtlOn-ds opposed to the SImple ncv.-vcrsus-rcne"al Lie dlStmc-
tlOn The,c studIes did /lot find that the ratc charged on d loan de-
pended on the ,trength of the bank-bOt rower reidtlOnshlp although 
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other eVidence of relatIOnship lendmg was found m the firm's trade 
credit arrangements 
Our analy"s IS similar to thIS second strand at the empmcal lItera-
ture m that we focm on the duratIOn at the bank-borrowel relationship 
as a mcasure of ItS strength We abo share With these studieS a focus 
on small, mostly untraded firms for which the bank-borrower rc\allon-
ship IS hkely to be Important ThiS differs from the bank-umqueness 
studies, which generally concentrated on large, pubhcly traded firms 
that may be less dependent on bankmg relatIOnships Our study and 
the Petersen and Rajan (1993, 1994) studIes also share a thlfd advan-
tage over the bank-UnIqueness studies We are able to test dlfectly the 
predlcllons of thc recent theoretical models of relatlOmhlp lendmg 
about the path of loan mterest rates over the course of the bank-
borrower relatIonshIp 
Our approach, however, dIffers from the Petersen and Rajan (1993, 
1994) studIes m two Important ways First, we focus exclUSIvely on 
lendmg under Lies The Lie " an attractIve vehicle for studymg the 
bank-bon ower lelatlOnshlp because the Lie Itself represents a formal-
!latton of thIS relatlonshlp By IImltmg our study to Lies, we exclude 
from our data set most loans that are "transactlOn-dnven" rather than 
"relatIOnship-driven" and may thus aVOId dllutmg our rclattonshlp 
lendmg resulb 
Second, we analyze the empmcal a5'OCldtton between relatIOnship 
lendmg and the collateral deCISIOn, provldmg the first test of Boot and 
Thakor's (1994) theorettcal predlcttons about collateral and the first 
analYSIS of the pdttern of collateral reqUirements over ttme We also 
test some proposlttons from the collateral lIterature about the assocta-
tlons among collateral, borrower fisk, and loan nsk 
Our data are drawn from the National Survey of Small Busmess 
Fmances (NSSBF), which contams extensive mformatlon on both bor-
rowers and loan contracts, as well as mformatton on the relatIOnship 
between the bank and the borrower By way of preView, we find that 
borrowers With longer bankmg relallonshlps pay lower mterest rates 
and are less lIkely to pledgc collateral These findmgs arc both stattstt-
cally and economically slgmficant despite relatIvely low R 2s and gener-
ally m"gmficant coeffictents of the control vanables 
Our relationship lendmg findmgs are con"stent With the lheorettcal 
predictions of Petersen and Rajan (1993) and Boot and Thakor (1994) 
and supporllhe mOle general theorettcal hterature on the role of banks 
a~ mformatlOn producer~ OUI results arc aho con~lstcnt With much 
of the bank-umqueness hterature However, our findmgs confhet With 
the loan pncmg IC'UItS III the second strand of the empmcal bank-
borrower relatIOnship hterature, which dlaws Its data from the same 
source We attnbute thIS dlfferencc to our exclUSive use of Lie loans, 
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whIch are more likely to re1lect I elatlOn,hlp cf1cch thdn dre othel 
loans AdditIOnal eVIdence to 'uppo, t th" attnbJltJ('" " plescnted 
below 
The drtlcle " orgamzed as follows SectIOn II J"clh,es the extant 
hteraturc on reldllamh", lendIng Sec lion III descnbes thc data set 
and mottvdte.., the vanahles used In thE' dnJ]y";;15 SectIOn IV ple"ent~ 
OUf econometnc tests of the detciffilOdtlon of the 10dn fAte dnd whcthet 
collateral IS pledged, both a, funetllll" of the strength of the b,mk-
borrower relatIOn~hlp dnd other vanqhlc", SrcttvD V cOlhJudcs the 
dIscussIOn 
II The Relallonshlp Lendmg LIterature 
The mformatlOn-bd..,ed literature on financldl IOtcrmedldtlOn (e g Dia-
mond 1984, 1991, Rdmakmhnan and Thakor 198.1, Boyd and Prescott 
1986) ,uggesb that financial mtelmedMrlCS eXISt because they enJoy 
economle~ of scale and/or comp8fdJIve ddvdntdgc'S 1t1 the productIOn 
of mformatlOn ahout bOlfower5 Banks In partJCulal ",pccldhLe In lend-
mg to d highly tnfOrmatlOn-problematlc cld..,.., of horrowu.., Because 
of thIS specwlJ7atJOn, contractmg In the bdnk 10dn market appea" to 
dIffer ,ubstantlally trom contractmg in other major debt ,ndrkets (sec 
Carey, PIOWSC, Rea and Udell 1993) One kdture ofttn dscnbed ta 
commcrcml bank lendmg " It, emph"Sls all relatIOnshIp 'cndmg , 
Bank, may acqUIre mfOi matlon through the rciatromh,p by momtorlng 
borrmA(er performance ovel time undcr Cled!t drrdngcmcnt.., dnd/Ol 
through the prOVISion of other ... crVlrc.., ..,uch d ... dep0..,it rlLcounh (.,ee 
Allen, Saunders, and Udell 1991, Nakdmllrd 1993), banks may then 
use this mformatIOn m de~lgmng futUi e CI edit contraU.., 
Some ~tudlC~ hdve ..,pectficdlly modeled the ~l"~OclatJOn between the 
length of the bank-borrowc, I elatJ(ln,hlp dlld the pncmg of loan, In 
an extemlOn of Dlamand (1989), Petersen and RaJan (1993) developed 
a theoretical model wllh both advel,c selection alJd 'noral hazard m 
which banks offer hIgher rates m the nl q pCrlod, when bon ower type, 
arc unknown, and then reduce fatc~ In leiter p~flod<., ()fter borrower 
types have been revealed Boot and Thakor (1994) dem01"trated that 
the duration of the hank-borrower lcldhon"hlp may hI..- !lllportant 111 
determlOmg loan pnce~ even In ct model WIthout a learnm!l component 
They also found that collateral reqllJrement, arc rdated to the length 
ot the rclatlOn~hlp Borrower~ pay a high I ate dod pledge collateral 
early Iil the relatIOnshIp, they then pay a lower rate and do not pledge 
colJdtcrdl IdteI III the reldtlOIlshlP after they hdvc demOn'itrdted ..,ome 
project suc(.,e~~ 
1 Some theoretlc,I' P,tpo...-IS hdve form.-lIJy ex,{I111ned the che",' bet ,een hcmk deht 
dnd publiC debt (e g Dldmond 199J Rd)dn 11,192) 
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The Petersen and Ra]an (1993) and Boot and Thakor (1994) models 
stand m contrast to other theones Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia 
(1989), Sharpe (1990), and Wilson (1993) all demonstrated condillons 
under which lenders SubSidiLe borrowers m early penods and are reim-
bursed for th" SUbSidy m later penods Thus, thc iSsue of the associa-
tIOn between loan pncmg and the length of the bank-borrower relatiOn-
ship is uillmately an empmcal one In additIOn, as noted above, no 
One has prevIOusly tes ted the empmcal associallon between collateral 
and the length of the bank-borrower relatIOnship 
The bank LlC is a parllcularly Important part of relationship lendmg 
because it represents a forward commitment to provide workmg capital 
financmg under pre speCified terms 2 It is not surpnsmg therefore, that 
much of the empmcal literature on bank umqueness has focused on 
bank LlCs James (1987) found posillve abnormal returns aSSOCiated 
with announcements of firms who were granted bank LlCs Lummer 
and McConnell (1989) and Wansley, Elayan, and Collins (1992) found 
eVidence that James's results were dnven by LlC renewals as opposed 
to newly imllated LlCs ThiS result is conSIStent With the notIOn that 
mformalJon about the borrower IS acqUired over lime through the 
bank-borrower relatIOnship and IS reflected In the contmuallon of 
credit arrangements, as opposed to imtlal credit assessments Billett 
et al (1995), however, found no difference In the announcement effects 
between new and renewal LlCs 3 One explanatIOn for these disparate 
results may be that the new-renewal bmomml categonzatlOn of LlCs 
is at best a weak measure of the strength of the relatIOnship As In 
Petersen and Ra]an (1993, 1994), we aVOId thiS measurement problem 
by usmg the contmuous duratIOn of the bank-borrower relatIOnship as 
a measure of its strength Also, unlike the umquene;s event studies 
that focus pnmanly on large, pubbcly traded firms, we use data on 
small mostly untraded firms, whIch tend to be much more bank de-
pendent 
Petersen and Ra]an (1993, 1994) also used the NSSBF data source 
to analyze relatIOnship lendmg and found somewhat confllctmg results 
As m th" artICle, they used the length of the bank-borrower relatIOn-
ship as a measure of Its strength They found no statistical assocJallon 
2 Mo<;t Lies contam matenal adver,>e change (MAC) cl<lllc,ec, that permit the bank to 
abrogate the commitment If the borrower'~ financldl condition haS changed ~ubstantldlly 
However, these c1ause~ can on I) be contmgent on venfiable characten~tlc~ of the bor-
rower In dddltlOn, hecause of reputdtlOn effecb and lender hdbllity ldw<;, bank~ may 
be rciuddnt to Invoke the~e c1au<;e., except under exlleme conditIons (see Avery and 
Berger 1991) 
3 Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) rlJ ... o found higher abnormal returns for 
higher-rated lender<; Other papers have found that the IOdn-announcement-telated ab-
normal return~ may be d~soctated With firm charaetell ... tICS Slovm, Johnson, dnd Glas-
cock (1992) found a negative d ... .,ocmtlon With firm ~Ize and Be ... t and Zhang (1993) found 
a POSitive a<;sOCtatJon With fOreCd.,t:'l of dechnmg or uncertam edrnmg<; 
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between the ,trength of the bank-borrowcl relallOnslllp and bu"ne" 
loan pnelllg III lhen 1994 paper (they dId not IIlcludc the length of the 
bank-borrower relatlon,hlp III the loall pllcrng equation In thell 1993 
paper) However, they dId find eVIdence of a lc',er dependence on 
trade credIt by firms with longer bankmg reldllon,hlps, whIch supports 
the value of reiallOnshlp lendmg 
Pclc"en dnd RdJan', faIlure to find eVIdence of feldtlon,llIp lendmg 
III bank loan pncmg whIch I un' countcr to our findlllg' below, may 
be atlnbutdble 10 thclI melu'lOn at all type, of external 10dns In thell 
data set rather than focll,lIlg on iMnk LlC, 4 lhat ", they lllcluded a 
numbel of dIfferent type, of loans for whIch reput?llon and relatIon-
shIp effects may be sllb,tantlally Ie" un pOi tant than tho,e a"ocrated 
WIth the forward eommllment embodIed III all Lie Th"se non-Lie 
loans lllciuJe mortgages, eqUIpment 10dn" motor vehIcle 10dl1' , dnd 
other spot loans, mdny of whIch mdY be one-time loans or loan, for 
nonrecurring credIt need, In the pdflance of Wall Street, these loans 
tend to he "tran"actlOn-dnven" ratht'f thdn "rclatlOn'ihlp-dnvcn " 
Thus, the loan pncmg effect of relatIOnships may have been dIluted 
by the mciuslOn of these I(MIlS III theIr sample, In contra,t, we "mIt 
our analys" to only loan, drawn under LlCs ' 
III. The Data Set 
The NSSBP prOVides more cxten~lve mformal'on on mdlvldual ..,mall 
bllslllesses than does any other pubhcly dVdllable ,ource rhe survey 
wa, conducted III 1988-89 by the Federal Reserve Board and the Small 
BUSlIlc>s Admml,tratlOn (SEA) rhe data were obl,ullca by telephone 
mtervlCW~ WIth executive.., of ab{)ut 3,400 bU"imc..,,,e~ Lach mterview 
consl~ted of about 200 questIOn'S c(}vcnng firm dcscnptlOll, gover-
nance, hl'itory, u..,e of credIt, relatIOnship", WIth financldl m<.,t1tutIOns, 
dnd balance sheet dnd income mtormdtion I he rc'Spondenh rcpI ~..,ent 
a strdtlfied random sample, by SlLe dnd geography, offor-profit, Ilonag-
ncultural nonfinancIal firms ApprOXlm,tlely 80~ of the ,ample had 
less than 50 employee" 10% hdd 51-100 employee, and 10% had 
101-500 employees Nearly all of the firm, were pnvately o,,"ed-·-
only about 5% were publicly traded Asset SlLe ranged up to $219 
million The geographical reprc~entatlon Wd~ abo i clatlvely unlfOi m 
WIth about 25% each from the northea,tern, n", th centl al southern, 
and we"tern ",tatc~ 
4 Peter.,en dnd RdJdn excludt..d loam holO the OVdlt-r ,)r the owner ~ IdmJiy By 
iot..u<ilOg on Ju~t bdnk Lie .... 'A-e ,tho exclude thc':>c IOdn .... (roul our d,lld .... ct 
'5 Peter~en dnd R<Val1 (1993, !Y94) dbo eXamlOcd the a ....... OCidtJOn betwcen 10.1n rate~ 
dnd the age of the firm dud found th,t( older nrm<; had lower bOlIO\\mg co"t ... ,1<; we 
find below Pe:cr'len dnd RaJan (1993) found that thl .... d ....... Ocldllon w '" ... lronger In lc~s 
t..onccnlrdtcd nldrkeb 
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Table I de,cnbe, the vanablcs used 10 this study, broken down 
mto five mam categones LlC contract charactemtlcs, firm financial 
charactenstlc';;, firm governance chdractenstlcs, mdustry charactens-
hcs, and mformahon/relatlOnshlp charactenstlcs Lookmg fi"t at the 
contract LharaUfllstl(S of commercial LlCs, PREM IS the premIUm 
over tbe pnme rate at which loans drawn under the LlC are pnced,' 
COLLAT mdlcatcs whether the LlC IS secured, which IS further de-
composed by type of secunty-ARINV for accounts receivable and/ 
or mventory, and OTHERSEC for all other secunty, mcludmg eqUip-
ment, real estate, and personal asset, of the owner; 
The dl,tmcllon between ARINV and OTHERSEC IS Important to 
the analys" Prachhoner; tend to vIew LlCs secured by accounts re-
ceIVable and mventory as the nsklest type ofworkmg capItal financmg, 
and so PREM may be expected to be hIgher for the,e loans to compen-
sate the bank for thIS nsk Perhaps more Important for analYLmg rela-
tIOnship lcndmg, ARINV financmg or "asset-based lendmg" generally 
mvolves a form of mten,e momtonng not associated With other type, 
of loans ThIS type of momtonng, whIch mcludes observatIOn of ,ales 
mVOlcmg dnd Inventory management, may produce valuable mforma-
hon about overall firm performance as well as mformallon about the 
value of the collateral (Swary and Udcll 1988) Such mformatlOn may 
be parhcularly valuable for young firms early m theIr bank-borrower 
relatIOnshIps when there IS substantial uncertamty about their ablhhe, 
to repay loans If so, ARINV financmg may mvolve the bank acqumng 
more mformahon per year through the relatIOnship than IS customary 
WIth other types of loan, and usmg thIS mformatlOn to deSIgn future 
loan contrach The mcluslOn of different types of collateral dlstm-
gUlshes our article from prevIOus studies of busmess lendmg 7 
6 One element of the pm.e vector about "'hlCh \\Ie do not h.1ve dat.1 I~ the LlC fee 
Pre,,>uffi.1bly, PREM IS less than It otherWise would be becau~e the b.1nk recelve~ <;orne 
compematlOn from fee Income Thl<; cOlild create d hlas If the fees VdTV sy~temattc.1lly 
With the char.1denstJ(..~ of the mdlvldudl bOTTower~ used dS exogenou<; vanable<; We 
do not expect thiS omISSion to create ,>ubstantJal bld~, however, Slllce mo~1 of any 
systematic vanatlOn to fee~ would hkely be related 10 the poliCIes of the bank rather 
theiO to the chardden~tlL"> of the mdIVldu.11 borrower~ 
7 A further dl~hnctlon can be made between "lll~lde ' collateral (a~set<; of the bor-
rowmg firm) and "out<;lde ' collateral (.1s~et<; oUblde the firm belongmg to eIther the 
owner of the firm or another mterested pJ.rty, such as a rndJor customer of the hrm) 
InSide coiJateral reorder~ the claims of credItors, whereas outSide coUater ... ! provlde~ 
addltlOndl asset<; for the ~ecurcd credltor~ to claim The theoretlcdl models m the litera-
ture generally focus on outSIde collateDI, WIth the exceptJOn of Swary and Udell (1988) 
Unfortunately, data hmltatlon"> prevent a c1e.1n dl~tmctlOn between mSlde and out">lde 
collaterdl <;mce the NSSBF ,,>uney focu<;ed on the type of asset pledged rather than ItS 
owner,,>hlp Nonetheless, ..... e may conclude that ARINV IS almo<;t surely all mSlde collat-
eral, although OTHER~EC lIkely mdllde~ many ('.1':!e<; of both mSlde and ollt~lde collat-
erdl It IS .11<;0 mtere"tmg to note that the S8A recently announced a new IOdn program 
that, for the fint hme WIJl proVIde a govetnment gU.1r.1ntee for LlC" secured by ARI"NV 
Ihl<; IS a <;lgmfiLant departure for the SBA which prevlOu~ly had ~uh<;tantlally hmlted 
the scope of ItS guarantees to amortIZIng term loans Some lender<; hdve expressed 
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Premium mer the pl'rne rdle 
- 1 If loan I ... secured 
"" 1 If loan I ... <;ecured b~ dccount .. rc<..elvdble dnd/ 
or Inventory 
1 If loan I:' securt-d by other Hun ,\u.ounh re-
celvdble dnd/or J1iventory 
= 1 If 10dO I ... guar<tntecd 
:0 t if 10dn leqUlrc~ <..O!npen"dtlOg hdldn<..e" 
I evcrctge 10tdl dcbt/d:.seh 
Pletax profit mdrgm (/{ of .. <'ks) 
Cunt.-nt rdllO r(cllrrent d ... seh)/(wrrent hdblhtle<;)] 
QUick ratio r(cunent d ...... eh - ll1\cnto,y)/(current 
hdbt!ttles)] 
Accounts Tccen·able tUIIHWt.1 In tidY:' [(account<; 
recclvdble)/( ... dlcs /day)j 
Inventory turnover III d.w ... [lnventorv/fco"t of 
good ... sold)/day] 
A<..counh paydble turnover In ddV<; [(.Keodoh pay-
dble)/(.Ost of good<; ... old)/ddyJ'" 
I otrll firm ds<;eh (Ill thou ... dnd<, ot dolldr:.) 
= 1 If firm IS d non-~llbclhlPtt. ... S wrpor,l!tol1 
-=- I If firm h d Subchaoter S COlVOldtlOtl 
= I If iii m I~ a Pdrtn('r~hlp 
= 1 If fil m I~ a proplIeto, ... hlp (ex<..luded tram re-
grcS<;10n" dS the bdst': cu~e) 
--- 1 Jt firm I.., owner man<lged 
= 1 11 at led,t 50% owner..,hlp 1<; In one fdmily 
--= I It lD con::.truL.tlon mdu"lry 
1 If m ~erVl(.e:. mdu:.try 
= I If In retail mdustry 
= 1 It In other Indu"tlle" (excluded tram the re 
gle~~IOn<; d<, the h,l',e c.-t"e) 
Number of yeal <; current owm rs have 0\\ t't.d the 
hrm+ 
I ength of rcidtmoshlp \\ Ith <..urrer)! lender lD 
year~ 
* Because of data av,llldblltt\ (,.o,>! of good.., ~old PCI ddY Wd~ lJ~ed In pbLe ofpurdM~("'" reI day 
t A mdXlmum Ilimt of 30 )ear~ Wd~ Imrmcc\ on AGJ-< and RLI AT[ 
+ If the hrm \\,l~ dlffu"dy held lhl.-n AGl equJ.h the n Jmb--r ot 'yedr'> that thL ilr'TI h", been In 
eXl~tcn(,.[ ... 
The dummy varIable GUAR md,catc, whether the Lie IS guardn-
teed Guarantee~ are generally provided by the firm', owne" and give 
the lender recour.;;e agdln.;;t the owner.;; for any defiuency In payment 
con<..ern about th~ ne'A pIOgrdm b~cduse of tJ~~--~;lt~-n~e "lOnltOfwh d<;"ocJatcd wIth 
ARINV and becau<;e ot the per<..elved mkme~" of ttll" tyre of <;ecl1led lendmg (~cl/ 
1994) 
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by the bOITOWIng firm Guarantees are 51mllar to the pledgmg of per-
sonal collateral, although they do not Involve specific hem The 
dummy COMPBAL mdlcates whether the LlC has a compensatmg 
balance reqUirement 
The jznanual (hwu<lensllu of the firm con"st of key financial ra-
ltos, including the leverage ratIO (LEV), the current rallo (CURRAT), 
the qUlck ralto (QUICKRAT) accounts receivable turnover (AR-
TURN), Inventory turnover (INVTURN), accounts payable turnover 
(APTURN), and total asseh (TA) The purpose of the financial van-
abIes [s to control for the observable fISk of the bOi rower m our regres-
sIOns that determme the loan I ate and whether collateral" pledged 
It [s e~pected that all else equal, nskler bOi rowers would pay higher 
loan rates and pledge collateral mOre frequently, and pnor empmcal 
analys" " conSl'tent with these expectatIOns (e g , Berger and Udell 
1990, 1992) Most of the finanCIal raltos are among the ratIOs conven-
tIOnally used In credIt nsk analysIS and so should correspond reason-
ably well to the data used by banks In makmg theIr loan rate and 
collateral deCISIOns 
The governance ,haraclemtlLI mclude the legal form of the firm 
CORP for (non-Subchapter S) cOlporatlOn, SUBS for Subchapter S 
corporatIOn, PART tor pal tnershlp, and PROP for sole propnetorslup, 
OWNMG mdlcates whether the firm was owner managed, and 
CONC50 Slgmfies whcthel 50% or more was owned by a "ngle famIly 
The governance chaJactenshcs arc mcluded because different owner-
shIp structu[es may be related to the amount of pnvate mformatlOn 
that borrowers bave, the nsks that borrowers take, and the abilIty of 
borrowers to shift nsk to the bank and other fixed-claIm holders All 
of these factors should figure In the determInatIOn of loan rates and 
collateral reqUIrements 
Indus/! y ,hm actensllu are reflected m dummy vanables for 
whethel the firm IS m the con,trucllon (CONSTR), services (SER-
VICES), or retail (RETAIL) 1I1du,tnes The bulk of the remalOlOg 
respondents (OTHERIND) were m the manu[actunng sector AgalO, 
these vanabJes are mcluded because they may help proxy for mk m 
our equatIOns that determme the loan rate and the probab[hty of collat-
eral helOg pledged 
The informatIOn/relatIOnship chalUctellltlu consISt of AGE and 
RELATE The vanable AGE refers to the numbcr of years that current 
ownership has been In place If the firm IS currently owned by ItS 
founders, then AGE represents the actual age of the film The vanable 
RELATE IS the numbel of years that the firm has conducted buslOess 
WIth Its current lender dnd represents our measure of the strength of 
the bank-borrower relatlOnsh[p 8 The purpose of RELATE IS to cap-
8 An uppet hmlt of W year" Wd~ Impo,>cd on AGE and ReLATE ThiS Impo,>es the 
re'>tnctlOn that no .lddltlOoai ]eievanl mfOrm<ltlOO IS revedled after 30 years For the few 
pubbcly lrdded firms AGF Wd:'. a\"o set equdl to 10 
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ture the ahlllty of the bank to ledrn more about the borrowmg firm 
through the bank-bon ower relatIOnshIp There h an "npOitant d"tmc-
tlOn between AGE and RELATE AGE reflecI' mformatlOn that be-
come'3 reyedled to the market a'3 d whole-that I"', d firm'.., public 
reputatIOn-whIle RELATE refiect' pnvate InformatIOn revedled 
thlOugh the mtermedlatl()n ploces; only to the lende, through the 
bank-borrower relatIonshIp Thu" the dIfference between AGE and 
RELATE e"enUally con esponds to the d"tmulon between reputa-
tIOn and momtorIng m DIamond (1991) 
The '"e ()f both AGE and RELATE also may help d"tmgUl,h the 
role of hank loan, ve"us publIc debt offenng' It would be expected 
that AGE would have an effect m publIc malkets but that RELAIE 
would not ..,mec the Investor.., who buy publIc I'3SUC\ do not galll accc~.., 
to exc!u':.lve mfOimatlon from momtonng Il1 the ",arne way the'lt bank ... 
do Thus, our mam relatIonshIp test, at whether RELATL hd' effcct, 
on PREM and on the probabIlIty of COLLAT may al,o be vIewed 
as tests of the 'pecIalne" or UnIquene" ot bank, As noted earlIer, 
RELATE IS al,o lIkely to be a better mea,ure of the strength of the 
bank-bOlrower relatIOnshIp than the dl,tmctIOn bet"een new a"d re-
newal LlC, u,ed In Lummer and McConnell (1989), W.mslcy, Elayan, 
and CollIns (1992), and BIllett, flannery, ami Garhnkel (1995) Al-
though we are pnmanly mterested In the effects ot RbLA TE, It " 
Importdnt to mclude AGE In the analy,lS as a control vanable to aVOId 
bras, smce AGE and RELATE are so hIghly correlated (p ~ 476) 
In the empmcal tables below, we report the rcsult, of rcgre",ons 
In whIch we 'peclfy the natural log, of AGio and RELATE-LNAGE 
and LNRELA TE, respectIvely Th" allows tor the pOSSIbIlIty ot d,-
IluDlshmg margmal effed~ of addItional years III hU~lllc",,,, or 10 a rcld-
tlOn':>hlp on the Value of Information g,uned ThJ.t 1"1 we expect that 
the margmal effect of the fifth ye.u of AGE or RELATE to be more 
Import"nt In revealIng mformatlOn about the til m than the twenty-fifth 
year, by wh1ch tIme vIrtually all of the mfonllatlon that" gOIng to be 
revedled ha~ been revedled As dl..,cu~"ed below, we di.;;;o run ro-
bustne" check, WIth AGE and RELATE measured m levels rather 
than logs, and WIth ,econd-order terms 1Il both the logs and the level> 
The medns of the val\able, for the enllfe sample of 863 firm, who 
reported LlCs are ,hown III the first column of tdble 2 1 hese means 
reveal scvcldl Illtere~tlDg Ch.lldctenstlc~ of <.,mctJl fllm ... usmg L/e\ 
rhe va>;t mdJol1ty are owner managed (89Q7c) With a ~lTIgle fdlmly own-
mg more thdn half of the stock (SO'X) Mo,; are abo orgdlllled as 
non-Subchapter S cOrpOtdtJons (550/) COll"stcnt with other data 
sources the maJonty of the lICs are secured (53%) u,ually WIth 
accounts lecelvable and mventory (360/,) Only 7% at all L IC, In the 
sample have compensatmg balance reqUJJ emcnh ,uggeqmg thdt thIS 
pncmg element no longer pldY'" a promment rok for 'imall film"! The 
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TABLE 2 Variable Means-Lmes of Credit 
Totd! Asseb. rotal A~~et<; 
All dbove below 
Vdnable FIrm<; )500,000 $500,000 
PREM" 149 1 32 1 71 
COLLAr 53 59 47 
ARINV 16 46 25 
OTHERSEl 18 14 22 
(,UAR 41 46 35 
COMPBAL 07 09 us 
LEV 60 60 59 
PROFMARG 12 08 16 
CURRAT 3 51 290 413 
QUICKRAT 252 185 320 
ARTURN 34 11 42 14 2587 
1NVrURN 10330 10398 10262 
APTURN 9190 95 53 8818 
lA 2,11166 444295 16584 
CORP 55 70 38 
SUBS 16 20 13 
PART 07 05 08 
PROP 22 04 41 
OWNMG 89 85 92 
CONCSO 80 73 86 
CONSTR 14 11 15 
SERVICES 16 10 22 
RETAIL 23 19 27 
OTHERIND 47 57 36 
AGE 14 10 1649 11 66 
RELATE 1139 1267 10 08 
Number of ob-
~ervatlOns 863 437 426 
" PRl:,M available for 371 219, and 152 obsen'dtlOn' onh See text 
data also mdlcate that the small firms wIth Lies have been In busme% 
under CUI rent management about 14 yea" on average (AGE) and have 
a constant bankmg relatlOmhlp for the last 11 of those years 
(RELATE) 
We also splIt the sample roughly m half between firms wIth a"ets 
above and below ~500,000 As shown In columns 2 and 3 of table 2, 
the d~ta suggest that firms WIth a"ets greater than ~500,OOO may be 
qUIte dIfferent from smaller firms In that they are much more lIkely to 
be corporalIons, they are much more lIkely to pledge collateral, they 
generally have lower lIqUIdIty ralIos and lower profit margInS, and they 
tend to pay a lower PREM The data also show that firms WIth assets 
above $500,000 are about 5 years older on average than firms WIth 
assets below $500,000, and have bank-borrower relatIOnshIps that are 
about 25 years longer on average We emphaSIze that ~)OO,OOO In 
assets IS qUIte small, and that our subsamples above and below thIS 
threshold should both be conSIdered small films 
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IV. Econometric SpecificatIOn and fe,' Re'olt, 
In our empIrical ana'Y~ls, we tc"t the jomt hypothe~l" thJI «() bank ... 
gather valuahle mformatlOn about d oOfrovVcl ... Jv..:;r tre r()ur~c of d 
bank-borrower relatIOnship, (11) that thf'Y u ... e thl" mh1, ;(;dtJon tv n'finc 
the loan COlllldet tcrm~, dnd (Ill) thell thi<., 1<., icf'iccted In the loan Idte 
dnd the collateral requlremcnb "fhl';' mJY L: vlcYJed a<., d Idlher ~tfln­
gent tc~t of whether bank-borrov,cr reldtiOr:..,hlp .. gCtlClulC .. due \mcc 
we WIll not be able to detect If b,mk ... gclth,-, tnto"n,~tl()n ~"Jl,t do n,-)~ 
use It to change contract ttl Ill"> <;Iglllfil:lntly Ov--'::, liln ... or It tr,f'y lhdngc 
contract term~ other them the \odn Idte ('yo (_nILltCI,tl L) 
Note that the Icfiner1cnt of contl.H . .-t term" to bOth'W\"\ vvdh longer 
reldtlOnshlp~ (I e hIgher vdluc' or RELATe) CJ.11 C0I11":: about In £1t 
led"t two Ul..,tmct way~ Flr",t, for d glvcn bonov .. c th~ IOdn r<lte or 
collateral leqUJremcnh may be ,-,h£1ngC'~1 ,1.., t~lC !..;nglh of tl \.. l..::ldtlOn-
ShIP mCred"ie" Second, thcre md'y be d "'Ul v'j'vvl"hlj) cited In ~'" h'ch 
borrower.., with longer (c!atHln..,hip.., r~ly dJtJeldJI Idte', ~)I hdVC dlffer 
ent colldter.11 reqUIrement<., on dvcrLlgc thdll bOIIO\\-Cf', with ..,horter 
reiatlon"hlp" Thl.., l~ Slffilld1 to the \dectIun-OIl'Lr-tITIle mr~'hdfil..,m Il1 
Dldmond (1991) Por CXdlllPJc, b.ink ... Im~hf kdlO liltolffidtlon (~ur~n~ 
their relatIOn..,hlp" wIth bUI rO'NC.'" hi J. :ar-kn..,k puLl I thdt heir~ them 
dlstmgUl~h creditworthy ('1I"to01o.::l-. h\.JI'~ ul1lredlhvorthy dilL'" It trey 
offer prohibItively ~Xpell'<;lve tel Ill'" or 'llmplv I cfu'lc to relend to the 
uncredltworthy borrowers aftci ~dInjng ,orne C\pCllenLe with the:m 
the dveragc ob..,erved loan Intel Lst IdtC 1TIdY dcchne \V!th RbLArr r, 
a~..,ummg that thl\ hlgh-Il\k pool W,I, pdyInf: d leLltlvcly high .<lte on 
Its loans. In practice, It I.., probable thdt both o~ th~~c efte(.h rife In 
operation U loan fdte'. or co/ldlerd] rcqulIerncllh UC.L1I1lL \vlth th2 
length of the rciatlOn\hlp It I.., likely due Itl pdj L to ~omc contmuiIlg 
bOlrowero;; rccelvIng mOlC favorable i(,!,1n lClll1-. ~h1d m p.lIt to ..,ollle 
bOlrowers with reldtlvely unfavorubk term'l hdv 1 '1g thel leldtlon~hlp", 
termmated Both vfthesc phe[1(vIlcn.l dlC vdlld fepll..-"('otdtlon') of thL 
theory that banks. dCqll!fC 111fOl mdtlOn lhi uugh 1 ehtlon\.hlp lending and 
use thI.., mformatlOn to rehne loan CO(lt(dct tenn... In Llct nonpncc 
credIt I dtIOnmg or the o;;ettm,!; of <In 'nfimte Pi iCe to! (.Tcdll r..::ncvvaJ 
mIght be vICwed d"i the ultlllJdte 10dD contld(t Icfln-.::mcnt 
A Loan Rate Te\!\ 
We pelform empIrIcal te::,h, fir..,t Oil loan 1.11...,., dnd then on collatcial 
OUf 10dn Jate te~t\ dDdlYIC the deteJrr,!p,mh of PR!-.M the 10dJ1 rdte 
premIUm ovcr the bdnk''') PIlI1lC r..lte PRf'M \'1 r~f'J,--...,..,(.d on the loarl 
contract, financIal, governdncc, lndu:-..lt'y dnd Intormdtli..m/lcldtion-,hrp 
charactcn..,Vc'i of the firln rh?",-c t..::,r" oHcr the oppprtUntty 10 eXdlllJilC 
9 CmplrlLdl "lJpoort tor thl" hyp01hc ... I ... l ... dh" (_l!(1'I~telll \\I'h ~ool dnd Illilkor ... 
(1994) modt' ,<IOdJl Lontldctmg \',~IIUl d",.> ... Jlot In\OI\L Intorl11dtlon ProdultHm 
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the role ot reldlton,hlp lending In commercIallodn contractIng by mea-
sunng the effect of RELA T\:<' on the Intere,t rate of an LlC 
The NSSBF data set mclude, data on the mtere,t rate paid on the 
firm's mo,t recent loan, which IS often dlawn under an LlC The ,ur-
vey also gives informatIon on whether the loan was mdexed to the 
pnme and, If so, the premIUm over pnme (PREM) and whether It wa' 
fioatIng or fixed rate For purpme, ot th" analy"" the clcaneq data 
for loan-by-Ioan eompamon come, from U'Ing only fioatmg rate LlC 
loans that were IOdexed to the bank', pnme late 10 
I he PREM results for the entIre ,ample are shown In table 3 The 
legressIOn In the fi"t column of the table exclude, the potentIally 
endogenou, loan contI act vanables for collateral, guarantee" and 
compen,atmg balance" and should be Viewed d' the reduced form for 
PR\:<.M The coefficICnts of the mcluded vanable, may be mterpreted 
as the effecb of the,e van abies on the rate, mclu"ve ot any predicted 
rate-reducmg effect of collateral, guarantees and compensating bal-
ances that they may Imply For example, the coeffiCient of LEV reprc-
sents the a%OCldtIOn between leverage and the rate on the loan after 
takmg IOtO account the expected values of collateral, guarantees, and 
compensatmg balance..., tlldt a margmal Increase 10 leverage Imphe<., 
Thus, the coefficient, of the firm charactenstlcs In column I can also 
bc IllterpreteJ as reflecting the a"oclatlon between these chardcteIls-
tIcs and the nsk of the loan, as reflected III Its prIce 
Column 2 of table 3 Includcs all of the varIables III the first column 
plus the collaterdl, guarantee, and compen,atIng halance contract varI-
ahles The interpretatIOn of the bOilower and lelatlOnshlp charactcrlS-
tiCS now reflect their effech on the plemlUm excludlllg theIr effccts 
through the contract terms 11 Thus, the coeffiCient, of the film charac-
lO Flxed-rdtc LI( ~ ",erc excluded bccdllse It \Vd'> not pos\lble to construct d PRFM 
vanable thdt would he accurdte dod compclTahle to the PRFM for ftodtmg-fdtc Lie" 
hr~t, the loan fdte Ihelf appedr" to have sub<,tdotmlly dlticlcnt propertle~ for hxed-rdte 
dod flodtmg-fate loam For eXdmple prior re~carch <;hoVvcd Ihdt fixed 10,10 [<'lte" were 
"tICkler thdn il(Mting falL ... (Berger .md Udell 1990 1992) Second It 1, difficult to find 
a compdfdblc market [die to subtrdd [JOm the k1dn [dIe to mCd\Ure PREM A logical 
chotec might be the [die on d Tn::d..,ury secullty with apPIOXlrndtely the Sdme repayment 
duratIOn However thl" still mdY credte problem" of dCCUldCY and non .. ompardb,hty 
with the fixed-rate PREM bccau<;e (I) only the month ot the 10M' tdkedown 1"1 known 
and Tred,>ury fate,> often vaned con~lderdbly Within the month~ covered by our data 
set, (11) the repayment duration of the loan I" not known beeau~e the payment ~chedule 
IS not reported and becau,>e the callabllttv of commerl.ldllodn,> make ... the rrcpayment 
optiOn dlthcult to c\aluate and (Ill) the prune rdte which I" ... ubtractcd from our fiodtmg 
loan rates, J" kno\\-n to be ~tlckv lelatlve to Tred"lurv rates 
II A bJas could occur m e~tlmdtmg thIS equrltJon becduse the collateral, gUdrantce, 
and compemdtmg balance vafldblc"I ate endogenou"l to the hlln dnd reiatlOmillp chdrac~ 
teflstlc~ We d ...... ume d recur"lve model "Itructure here m which th..:: firm and relutlon,>hlp 
chdrdcten~tlcs explain the contract term ... up to random CHar., that ale not '>lgmficantly 
correlated WIth the PREM ellOf term OUI hndmg~ given JU"It below- that (I) the coeffi-
clent<: of the contract term", m column 2 dre not ~lgmficantly different flom LCro dnd 
that (ll) their mciU5.lO!1 hd'> no matenal eftect 00 the coeffiC1ent~ of the other valldhle,,-
~ugge~t that no sub"tdotJai bidS IS pre"cnt 
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lABLI: 3 Premmm over PrIme Rate (Nodhng Rate Only) tor Loam. ISI'oued under Lme.'. of Credit-All Firm SlLe~ 
OLS Regre..,.<.IOn\ f01 PREl\1 W 
'" .. 
Excludmg LOD.11 lncludlllg LOdll Contract 
Contract Term" All Van<tble" relm"lOnly 
(I) (2) (3) 
Vanable CoefbcJent f-Stdlistlc CoeHlclent t-StdtJstiC Coefficient t-Statl'>tlc 
INTERCEPT 23642"* 2 704 2 592S** 2886 1 3883" 9632 
AR1'1V 1330 701 2141 1 227 
OfHERSEC - 2440 - ~82 0424 173 
GUAR 0449 271 0091 056 
CO'rlPBAL - 0979 - 28; - 0319 - 1J93 
LEV 2262 783 1766 592 
PROF\1ARG 3232 933 3220 926 
ceRRAl 0058 093 0057 090 
QL1CKRU - 0473 - 718 - 0504 - 760 
ARTeRI\ 0029 1591 0029 1594 
1NVTUR' 0006 731 0005 634 
APTuR~ - 0004 - 5U~ - 0003 - 419 
L"TA - 0286 - 506 - 0457 - 778 
CORP - 5930*'1< -2261 - 6496*'" -2429 
SLB~ - 5202' -1741 - 5~89* -1781 
PART - 1709 - 4()1 - 2051 - 481 
OWI\MG 1227 I 339 3218 I 31" 
CO'lC50 1740 876 1972 981> 
CO'lSTR 2366 813 2799 949 
~ 
:,ERVICES 2538 1 001 2629 : 021 
RET~IL llt:l 5S4 1014 460 0 0 
~ Ll', '\GE - Ir6 - I 251 - 1280 - I 155 , • • .. Il\RELAl E - 2004*" -- 221'"' lY8i'" -21M -
" R' 089 095 00" '" = < • '\IoIL-NumbefofoosenatlOn) = ~71 OL,', = O-dl,lW\ 'cd5t~yUdl'-~ • 
, ';tdtlstlldll). ~lgf',fi"'d'lt at thl I00( level two-tailed ~ 
x ~tdtl\tlcaliY ~lgmhlant at the ,q lc\Lt tv,o-tddcd 
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tensllcs m column 2 can also be mterpreted as reflectmg the a"OCla-
tIon between these charactenstIcs and the nsk of the borrower, as 
reflected m the loan pnce The regressIOns m columns I and 2 may 
also be vIewed as robustness checks on each other-we expect tbat 
If re1allonshlp effects are strong, they should be present m both equa-
tIons The regressIOn m column 3 mcludes only the loan contract terms 
on the nght -hand sIde and will be discussed further below 
The most mterestmg results mcolumn I of table 3 are the Importance 
of the mformatIonirelatIOnshlp vanables, LNAGE and LNRELATE 
Both coeffiuents are negatIve, although the LNAGE coefficIent IS not 
staltsltcally slgmficant at standard confidence levels When thIs regres-
SIOn was rerun usmg levels m place of logs to measure the effects of 
AGE and RELATE (not shown), both coeffiCients were negative and 
stallsllcally slgmficant The negallve coeffiCients suggest that the older 
the firm IS m terms of current ownership and the longer the bankmg 
relatIOnshIp, the lower the rate on the loan (mcluslVe of any collateral 
and guarantee effects assocIated With these vanables) The RELATE 
results contrast sharply With those of Petersen and Rajan (1993,1994), 
who found a posillve but mSlgmficant effect of RELATE on PREM 
mstead of our negatIve, slgmficant effect 
We also mvestIgate whether the magmtudes of the measured AGE or 
RELATb effects on PREM are economically slgmficant The LN AG E 
coeffiCIent of about - 14 suggests that, all else held equal, a small 
firm With an additIonal 10 yea" of bus mess expenence, II years versus 
I year, pays an expected 33 basIs pOints less on ItS LlC loans (I e , 
- 14 x (In II - In I)) Slmtlariy, the LNRELATE coeffiCIent of 
about - 20 suggests that a firm With an II-year bankmg re!allonshlp 
can expect to pay an L/C loan premIUm 48 baSIS pomts Ie" than a 
film that IS the same m every way except that It has only a I-year 
relatIonship Note that these figures are addillve, rather than mutually 
exclUSive, so that an II-year-old firm WIth an II-year bank-bOiTowcr 
relallonshlp can expect to pay about 81 baSIS pomts less than a I-year-
old firm WIth a I-year relatIOnship 
In order to determme whether these changes m PREM are economi-
cally Important, we evaluate them m terms of our sample dlstnbutIon 
of the PREM vanabk 12 The sample denSIty of PREM (not shown) IS 
concentrated almost enllrely on values of PREM that are diVIsIble by 
25 basIS pomts (I e , I 00%, I 25%, I 50%, etc) ThIS suggesb that 
banks group theIr borrowers mto pflcmg pools on the baSIS of fisk, 
relationship, and othel factors at 25-basIs-pomt mtervah Therefore 
the 33 baSIS pomt estimated AGE effect moves a firm more than a full 
pncmg pool, and the 48 baSIS pomt esllmated RELATE effect moves 
a firm about two full pncmg pools Moreover, 59 6% of the PREM 
12 We thank the anonymou~ referee for thts very helpful sugge~t1on 
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ob~ervdtlcns arc concentrated In rh<.- clo~':d mtclvdl be1wcCfl lOO and 
150 ba<.,!') pOlnts, sugge~tIn!! that our (ClatH.m<.,h!p cttcct~-wl-J.lch lowers 
PREM by dbout the breadth of thl' Interval wh~I1 REI A 1 ~ mere,,'''s 
by 10 yedr,-can by lhelfmovc a film', Idte below that Pdld loy mo,t 
othel ,mall firm, With Lie, 
To check robu"tness, we dl..,o eXdrJ1lTIcd the mdgOltudc" of the c~tt­
mdted effects u">mg three other spcclflcatlOn<.,--- ~econd ofdcl In the logs 
ot AGE dnd RELATE, hneal In the,r leveh, dud 'fcond order III the 
levels fhe ,econd-order equatlOll In k'g' adds the (erin' 112 LN AGE' 
112 LNRELATE', and LNAGE x J NR~LATE, and 'lmllari y for the 
'Gcond-order equdtiOn 1I1 levels rhe second-order equdtlons dllow the 
data morc [I eedom to choose the ... hdpe<" C't the curve" glvmg the marglOal 
effects of AGE and RELATE at dlffelcnt numbe" "fyeM, Incrcasmg 
AGE flOm I to II YCa!' while holdmg RcLA rE ,It .h sample medn 
vdlue, gives expected declines III PRE:M of66, 19, and 39 bd"S P<)lIlts 
f01 the three alterndtive -;peclf1uttron., n"'-Ipcctlvcl), a>; 0PP0'-lrd to the 
33 ba~J'" pomt'-l for the model 'ihow'l In tbe text ~lmll:;1fly In(! Ctl:'log RE-
LATE from 1 to II yea" "Iule holdmg AGE <It lh medn v,lluc lowe", 
PREM by predicted vdlues of 60, 21 dtld 29 b,'<I, 1'0mb, [c'pcellvely 
(a, oppo,ed to 48 baSIS pomt, for the lOb model) The'c aJd,t,ondl [C,ults 
,ugge,t that our conciuswll that the meq,ulcd AGE dnd RPLATb ef-
fects are economledlly meaningful IS robust, dlthough the least ~rcfel red 
lIneal '-IprclficdtlOTI (which force'-l .-1.11 yedr"j to have the "dme marglndl 
effect), Yield, notably ,mailer results 
1 he coefficlcnh of most 01 the cont",1 Vdl lables In column I 01 t dble 
3 are not '-ItdU'-ItIC<llly 5lgmficant 1 he exceptiOn'" dre CORP dlld SU BS, 
which .arc negative and statl5tKd.lly '-IlgDlfil-dn1 '-,uggc\tmg thclt loans 
to e!ther type of cOlpordlton tend to he sdier than OthCl 10dOS Most 
of the Vdlldblcs do have the predicted Slg''', dnd the mdgllltlldes of 
the eIght finaneldl Vdlldble, tdken together ,uggcsl that II all 01 these 
vdrldble'-l moved one "itd'ldard dCVldtIOil In the ritrcctIOr:. of grcdtel 
mk, PREM would Increa,e by 19 baSI' pomb rhlS movement In Ihe 
predicted dllection prOVides sume vcnficdtJOn of the model, de'-lplte 
the lack ot 5tatlstlcai Iflslgmficanl.c 'I he In~lgmfkctnce of Do"t of the 
contlol Vdlldbles could be a cono;;,cquence of low o;;tatl .... tlcal te'-lt power, 
given the large numbcr of pdr<1mcter" of the model relative to th(' 
hnllted number of ob..,cl YrltlOn'-l Another rotentldl I Cd,>on tor the InSlg-
mficance could bt- multlcolhnc.lflty MdflY of the 16 control vdlmbles, 
partIcularly the eight finane-wI vdfJ<lbk." dr,.:: Intended to proxy tOi 
borrower mk Each vdllablc cOllld InulVlductlly be In"8mfiCdnt, bllt 
the vanablcs a, a whole might be sIgnJficant However test, 0f the 
Jomt S1g111ficance of both the CL!!ht financ'dl Vd •• dbJc, togcthel dnd the 
16 total control vdrIahle, togcthel could not reject the null hypotheSIS 
that they Jomtly have zcro dfect Perhaps the most likely .c,,,on that 
mo~t of the control V3lictblcs arc mSlgl1lfic-mt <int! thdt the R"! of the 
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equatIon" relalively low I' that the pnemg of loan, to small bu,me;ses 
I' IdlO,yneratIe and often depends on the reputalion dnd credit of the 
busmess owners as much as or more than the reputalion and character-
IStiC' of the firm Thl' I' dlsell"ed further below Whatever the reason 
for the low R2 and the general lack of stallslleal slgmficanee of the 
control vanable coefficlCnts, It does not deli act from our central result 
the relatIOnship van able " both statistically and economically slgmfi-
cdnt over d number of different speclfil-atlons 
The second column III table 3 mcludes the contract va1!ables as well 
as all the firm and relatIOnship vanables from column I The AGE and 
RELATE effects are virtually unchanged from the pnor equatIOn rhe 
coefficients and I-,tallstlcs on LNAGE dnd LNRELA TE arc almost 
the same as earlier, so that only RELATE IS statistically slgmficant 
Once agam, however, both coefficient> were negallve and sta1ls1lcally 
~Igmficant when thiS !egrc~~lOn \Va" rerun USing level'i m place of logs 
The RELATE result, m columns 1 and 2 of table 3--plus the vanous 
checkli of "tahstlcal "Igmficance economic 'ilgmf1cdnce, and ro-
bustness-strongly suggest a role for pllvate mformatlOn acqUired 
thl ough I datlOnshlp lendmg whel e mfO! mahan becomes aVailable only 
to the speCific lender through momtonng over time The AGE results 
are 'iOmewhdt weakel, given that the coeffiCients are not dlways stah:-.-
1leally slgmficant, but they generally ,till support a role fOI reputatIOn, 
01 publIcly available IlltolmatlOn, which becomes available over time 
to the lendmg commumty a, a whole n 
The RELATE I esults m columns 1 and 2 are conSistent with the 
thearclIcal models of Petersen and RaJan (1993) and Boot and Thakor 
(1994) They may also shed some lIght on the ambiguous results found 
In the Uniqueness event ~tlldle~ that have exammed the difference In 
announcement effect, between new LlCs and renewal LlCs These 
,tudIes relIed on what may be d reldlIvely weak bmomIaI proxy for 
the stIength of the bank-borrower relatIonship-whether the Lie was 
new or d I enewa! Our methodology permit" a more revealing contmu-
ous medsure of the relatIOnship ItS length U smg thIS medsure (RE-
LATE), we find that the ,trength of the relatIOnship 1S an Important 
determtndnt of loan pr~cmg 
\3 It ,'> dho pO'>"lb1c that the RFLAl Ie, result", repre..,enl pubhe mformatlon to ,>orne 
degree If ditcrn,ltl\C lender~ ob~crve the length of the rCl<ltlOmhlp dod drc able to mfer 
that d longer cu'>h)mer l~ d beHel one, they IIl.lY Inake morc competitive offen. to 
borrO\\-er ... \\lth i<.tlger v<11uc.., of RFI ATF 1 he ]o\\-cr PREM d .. ..,OCldtcd With longer 
relatlOn~hlps could m paIi reflect the higher degree ot lompCtitlon among lender.:., for 
the<;e borrower" 1 hiS would be SLillllar to the lompCtltlve prace ... ., dc<;cnbed III 
(neenhaum et <1.1 (19R9) (although they I e<lched the OpposIte conclu"'lOn regardmg the 
a..,..,ocmtlOn between PRI::.\1 ilnd RFI Alb) We do not however expect thiS pubhc-
reveiatlOn-ot-pnv<lte-1OformdtlOn t:llect to be PdltlCuLlrly ..,trong 10 our sdmpie of <;mall 
firms smce there IS h1tle In th~ way of pubhc pronouncements and oUhlde monJtonng 
for film,> of thiS <;lze 
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We m.At deal with an nnre.,olvcd I~"lle 10 the colldteraJ t1tcldtllre~ 
the a"oelatlon, among collateral, borrower mk and loan mk Mo,t 
theO! etleal models of collateral demonstrale that collateral will be a"o-
clated With safer borrowers and loans (Bester 1985, Besanko dnd 1 hd-
kor 1987a, 1987h, Chdn and Kdnata, 1987), while others predict thdt 
mkler borrowers Will llIore often pledge collatelal (Swary and Udell 
1988, Boot, Tbakor, and Udell 1991, Black and de MeLd 1992) Most 
of the empmcdl collaterdl IIteratUle supports the view that collateral 
IS associated With rIskier borrowers dnd loans (Orglcr 197(), He\ler 
1979, Scott dnd Smith 1986, Berger and Udell 19'10, 1992, Booth 1992, 
1993) These empmcal studies havc been hampered by a dealth of ddta 
soulees on the rISk characterIstic, ofllldlvidudl bon ower; and the lack 
of detdlled mformatlon on thc type at collateral pledged--ploblems 
that we can resolve With our detdlled borrowcr mfOlmatlon and two 
type, of collatcral 
The legres"on III column, at table " which llldudcs only the loan 
contract telms on the rIght-hand sld~, te,ts the """elation hetween 
collateral and loan fISk The eollaterd tests presented later proVide 
some eVidence that secured LlCs dre associated With obsel vably llSk-
ler borrowcr~ But thiS doce., not necessanly mean that secured loan~ 
are relatively n..,ky becau~e rccoUl..,C against colldtcral reduce" the ll~k 
of these loans, pOSSibly to levels below those of nnsecured 10al1' The 
results In column 3 of lable 3 show posilive coeffiCients on both types 
of collaterdl, indicating higher loan ratc, for securcd 10dllS, although 
nonc of the 'lope eoefficlCnts In thiS equdtlon arc stdtislically Signifi-
cant either mdlvldually or JOintly, and the explandtOi y power of the 
regressors I' very low These results suggest thdt secured loans may 
be nsklCf thaD un"ccured loan~ ,l~ found In pIIor studie::... but the 3.%0-
clatlOn l~ not very strong dnd there ,.., not suffiCIent test power to reject 
the null hypotheSIS of no ,tdlistleal ."ocratlOn 
TabJc~ 4 and 5 show the "lame lcgre'5'5lOn~ d.., In tdhlc 3, except that 
they are for fin", wllh dssels above and below ~500,OOO, respectrvely 
For firms With a"eis above $500 000 In table 4, the findIngs arc some-
what stronger than the findmgs for all firms m table 3 The LNAGE 
and LNRELATE coeffiCients ami i-stamtles are lalger and the R's 
are all hlghel In addition, In column 3 of tdble 4, the coefhclent of 
ARINV IS 35 and IS margmally statistically Significant ThiS suggest' 
that for firms With dssets above ~500,OOO, bcmg secured by accounts 
receivable and Inventory molY be an Important Indicator of higher loan 
n,k, for which the bank charge' dll addilIon.ll mk prunllim of dbont 
35 ba'is pomts 14 The R' for thIS equation IS stili very low, h0wever, 
14 SOllle cdutlOn <ihould be exelcl.,cd In Illtc.prcttng thl~ rC..,lllt reCdll<ie ARINV 
tmdncmg [yPIC<lJly rcqullC<i thdt bdnk<, clo<:.clv ffi()nttOI the Lolldterdl I hll'" the hlghet 
PREM for ARINV [OdO., OM'. be p, rtly expldmed bv the co<;t'-, of thl.., mOOltoflnL' tn the 
extent thdt thc..,c LO-'I:. ,ire lIOI rMJd for by lev:. 
TABLE 4 PremIUm Over Pnme Rate (Floatmg Rate On1y) for Loan., Issued under Lmes of Cre<ht to FIrms wIth Total A~~ets above $500,000 
OLS RegressIOns for PREM '" • 
Excludmg Loan lncludmg Loan Contract g-o 
Contr,Kt Term~ All Vanables Term~ Only • • 
(IJ (2) 13) .. ;; 
0 
,.. 
Vdndble CoefficIent t-Statl~tlc Coetfiuent (-StdtlstIC Coefficient t-StdtIstlC • 
0 • 
""0 !!-
'< INTERCEPT 3 2273* 1 864 3 5784** 2004 1 0645*>< 5667 J: 
~ 
ARINV 0329 145 3502* 1656 cO" 
::r OTHERSEC - 4210 -1 169 0907 257 
~ 
GUAR - 0073 - 036 162'5 ~19 
@ CO,IPBAL - 2836 - 702 - 1601 - 391 
N LEV 5077 1 162 5614 1 229 
0 PROHIARG 1852 391 2057 430 0 
~ CURRAT 0636 712 0705 816 
» QL1CKRAT - 2130** -2 113 - 2226** -2 188 ART URN 0021 1053 0021 1002 
;0 !/>;V [URN 0000 041 0002 141 
cO" APTURN 0001 141 0002 227 
::r L/>; rA - 0591 - 554 - ORIO - 741 
~ CORP - 8768 -1531 - 9501 - I 617 CJ) 
;0 SUBS - 8700 -1458 - 9439 -1 561 
CD PART - 1607 - 436 - 4337 - 520 
CJ) OWNMG 3931 1505 4141 1 561 
CD CONC50 2579 1 105 2768 1 176 < 
CD CONS1R 188; 1086 4348 1 204 
C. ~ERV!CES 5679 1 600 ;827 1611 
RETAIL - 2966 -1080 - 3291 -I 183 
LNAGt - 1870 -1397 - 1729 - I 276 
V,RELATE - 2163"* -2320 _ 2491"'''' -2406 
R' 155 165 018 
'\JUTE -Number at ob~LrvdtlOm = 219 OLS = Ordmdf) lea~t ~quare~ w '" ~ Std!l~tlcally ~lgmhcan! at the !00" level two-taIled '" "'* Stdtlstl,-dJ!) slgmficdnt at th(. "o/r le\c!, two-tdlled 
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dnd a test of jomt "gO/ficance at "II the coeffiLlents could nol ,eject 
the null hypothesIS of dll zero, 
In contra';t to these .,tI onger rE.,ulh tor firp1'.. w'th d. ... .,eb above 
~500,000, the regres"on, for hrms with a,,~t; below $500 000 In tdble 
5 show much gredtel weakne" Only one "f the mdependent varmbles 
IS stat"lleally sigmiicant dnd the R2, are about hdlf of those for fillm 
WIth d"et' above $500,000 III table 4 Thl' suggests thdt the pnemg of 
bank JOdn~ to very "mall tlrmo;; I ... tclatlvcly IdIO':.yncrdtlc i hI", 111d.Y be 
the case because the reputatlOl1 dnd financld.1 dccount<-. of thr hu:,lOc,:>::. 
and of Its owners are often not econolll1cally sepdrdble for small famlly-
owned and -oper,lIed buslne"es LJ nfortunately, we lack the pe"onal 
data on the owners thdt mIght he used by the bank, 'l1ch a, their credIt 
ht.,tory and how long they may hdve had pcr"olldl rcldtlon"hlp~ With 
the bank This problem lIkely dffects ma,lY of the firms "11th a"els 
over $500,000 m our sample as well, and mdy help explaIn why, even 
In tables '\ dnd 4, the R 2s are fdUly 10\1> and most of the control vall-
abies arc stdt"tlcally Inslgmficant IS Another rca,on why the AG£ dnd 
RELA'I E effect, may be mOl e difficult to estImatc for firms WIth assets 
below $'500,000 IS that these vandbles have smalier standard devIatiOns 
and are more highly correlated With edch other for the,e firms than 
for the subset With a"ets over ~500,OO() 
Overall the re'mlt~ ot the loan [;lte te,t ... ,uggc\1 that the bank-
borrower relatIOnship pldy~ an unpOi tant role In the pi ILmg of loans 
to smalt buslOe"es, wllh the possible exceptIOn of the vcry smdllest 
borrOWC1':l Our re~ulb are genclJ.lly con<.,l..,tcnt With the theoretIcal 
mode" of Petersen and Rajan (1993) dnd Boot dnd rhakor (1994), both 
of which generate a negative assocldlJon betv¥ccn loan [dte":. dnd the 
length of the bank-borrower relatiOnship 
A~ noted above, It l~ our cotlJecture that our iOdll rcitc te',t rc~ult" 
dIffer from those of Petc"en and RdJan 11993 1994) "hI' l1se the same 
NSSBF ddta source, pnmdnly because of Ollr focus on lines of credit 
We mclude only LlC loan, dnd exclude 'transdc1lon-dnven" loans, 
such a<o; mortgages, eqUipment loan">, m0tor vehicle loan ... dnd other 
~pot loan, To mve"-ltIgate thl"-l l~sue mOl c troroughly, we ccllculated 
"loyalty rattOs," which mdlcdtc how often bOirowcr;;; reu .. e the ~(Hnc 
bank f01 the same type of loan If what we call trdn'dctlon-dnven 
loan ... are actually rclatlOO"-lhlP dnvt"n then VvC would expect thJt firms 
WIth more than one of these 10dOS would almost dhvdY' have them at 
the ">drne hdnk In conlrd~t. If the~e loan ... eire generic bank product'; 
Without strong bank-bon ower tIe"-l, then fil 111'; With multiple lOath 
might often hdve them dt multiple institutIOns In the full NSSBF ,am-
ple (mciudIng borrowers wllh dnd w·thm,t LlC,), we found that of 
1'i fOl <! mOle complek dl~LUS',JOll of the mkgr,l\,,-ln of per .... orldl"nd hu .... me .... " acll"'-
t)e" d" .... ocldted With "m,tll buslne"", .... LC Ang (1992) 
TABLE 5 PremIUm over PrIme Rate (Flodlmg Rate Only) for Loans h.~ued under Lme~ of CredIt to FIrms wIth Total Assets below $500,000 
OLS Regre'>&IOn" for PREM '" • ---- ----- ~ E.xcludmg LOdn Includmg LOdn Contract • Contract Term~ All vanable::. Terms Only • • 
(I) (2) (3) 
.. 
'6 
0 " VarIable CoefficIent i-Stdtt::.tl'- Coefficient [-Stdtbtlc Coefhclent (-Stdll::.tlC • • 0 ----- ---- !l-""0 J: '< INTERCEPT I 9547 961 20661 977 I 7136"'* 7673 
~ 
ARINV 1688 474 2020 653 cO" 
::r OrHERSEC - 2014 - 517 - 0930 - 266 
~ 
GUAR 1636 123 - 1116 - 406 @ COMPBAL - 0120 -017 2502 416 
N LEV 0904 212 - 0178 - 083 
0 PROFMARG 5753 1044 5895 1056 0 
~ CURRAT 0145 146 0073 072 
» QUICKRAT - ()()51 - 052 - 0074 - 074 ARruRN 0056 1398 0061 1481 
;0 INVTURN 0010 813 0009 665 
cO" APTURN - (){I06 - 473 - 0006 - 451 
::r LNTA - 0574 - 359 - 0678 - 407 
~ CORP - 4234 -1189 - 5295 -1398 CJ) 
;0 SUBS - 3263 - 731 - 3417 - 749 
CD PART 0816 139 0429 071 
CJ) OWNMG 1645 308 1914 348 
CD CONC50 1682 439 \872 474 < 
CD CONSTR 3154 620 3695 694 
C. SERVICES 2533 609 2882 673 
RETAIL 6691 * 1 723 6677' 1674 
L'IAGE - 1404 - 660 - 1303 - 601 
LNRELATE - 0013 - 007 0091 048 
R2 1184 1191 007 
----
NOTE ~Number of observatlOm = 152 OLS = ordmary least sqlldre~ '" 
*- Statl~tlcall'y slgmficdot at the 10% level, two-tatled :::! 
h Stdtl~hcally slgmficant at the 5% level, two-tailed 
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borrower~ with two or more mortgagc\, only 45 7% had. these IOdns 
eon,ohdated at a smgle bank SImIlarly, eqlllpment loan, motor vehI-
cle loans, and other spot loan, had loyalty rat I'" of 508%, 52 3%, 
and 419%, respectIvely Thl", only about half or Ie" of the tlmc dId 
borrowe" WIth more than one loan ot a gIven type ha ve all of the 
same type at the same bank, sugge,tmg a lack ot loyalty that would 
be expected If these were relatlOn,hlp-dllven loan, Moreovel, when 
we group these four lypes of loans togethel, only 26 0% of borrower, 
with two or more of any of the,e type, at loan' had them concentrated 
at a smgle mslltutlOn By contra>t, ball owe", With Lie, demonstrated 
a hIgh degree of loyalty, supportmg our mtcrpretatlOn of the I /(' con-
tract as a formahzatlOn of a lendmg relatIOnship Of all borrower, WIth 
Lies, 88 8% had them WIth only olle bank, thu, the,c bonowers al-
most alway, have thell multIple loans undel Lies eon,ol,dated dt a 
smgle mslltutlOn These figures prOVide support for the conJecture that 
our flndmg of a S1gmficant etfect of relatlOn,hlp lendmg on loan pnces 
dlffef5 from that of Petersen and RdJ3n (1993, 1994) pnmaflly because 
ofthe[r mclus[on of tran,actlOn-dflvcn loan, that dilute the rriatlOllshlP 
effect 
A recent workmg paper by Blackwell and Willters (1994) also fo-
cused on Lies, but their loan pncmg results are unclear fhey used a 
sample of Lies drawn from two bdnk holdmg cOJllpames When they 
mcluded LN AGE and LNRELATE 1I1 the If PREM regressIOn" the 
coeffiCIents of both van abies were ncgdtIve (as expected), but the eoef-
fluent of LNRELATE was 110t stalistlcally "glllficant The LNRE-
LATE coeffiCient became s[gmficant when LNAGE was either 
dropped or replaced by In(AGE RELATI::), but [t IS unclear what 
these regressIOns [mply The droppmg of LNAGE obvlOu,ly creates a 
biaS bce,mse LNAGE ,md LNRELAIE Me hl?hly cOl[clatcd The 
mcluslOn of In(AGE - RELATE) along WIth LNRELATI:: Without 
also mcludmg LNAGE may create a SImilar biaS becduse 11 does not 
allow AGE to have an effect mdependent at RELA fE, d"plte the 
fact that Its mdependent effect wa~ ~hown In othCl Ic-grc5~lOn.., MOIe-
over, the margmal effect of RELATE on PREM depends on a comhl-
l1dtlon of two coefficlcnb m thiS equation but the \lgmfiCdt1CC of thl" 
combmalion was not lIIvestlgated Ihus, no other study to our knowl-
edge has estabhshed a Imk between the length at the relalionsh[p and 
the 10dn rate 
B Collateral 1 ests 
In Older to determme whether collateral requrremenh are greater or 
lesser for borrowers WIth longer bankmg reldtl0I1shlP~, we u')c IOgIt 
models to examme the probabilIty of an Lie bemg SClll[ cd Recall 
that Boot and Thakor's (1994) model predIct, th"t collater,,1 will less 
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often be pledged for borrowers with longer relatIOnships This predic-
tIOn IS also consIStent wIth conventIOnal wisdom among bankers 
Unhke the loan mterest rate data analyzed above, data on collateral 
are available for all firms with LlCs, not Just those whose last loan 
was a floatmg-rate, pnme-based draw under an LlC Therefore, our 
sample sIze IS more than tWice as large for the collateralleglesslons 
than the PREM regressIOns above, that IS, 863 observatIons mstead 
of 371 The explanatory vanables agam Include the firm', financial, 
governance, and mdustry charactenstIcs, as well as the mformatlOn/ 
relatIOnship vanables The other contract vanables, GUAR and 
COMPBAL, are excluded from the nght-hand Side of these regressIOns 
because of the pOSSlblhty that the collateral, guarantee, and compen-
satmg balance decIsIons are codctermlOcd 16 
Loglt regressIOns for the probablhty of any type of collateral bemg 
pledged (I e , prob(COLLAT) are shown In table 6 Column I shows 
the results usmg the entire data sample 17 The coeffiuents of the Infor-
matIOn/relatIOnshIp vanables, LNAGE and LNRELA fE, arc both slg-
mficant and negatIve In thIS regressIOn Both were also negatIve and 
slgmficant when AGE and RELATE werc mcluded as levels 10 place of 
logs 18 As above for the loan rates, the magmtudes of these coefficients 
suggest that they are economIcally slgmficant 10 determmmg whether 
collateral IS pledgcd The LNAGE coefficient of about - 19 suggests 
that, all else held equal, a small firm WIth II year; expcnence versus 
I year would have a probablhty of pledgmg collateral of about 12 
percentage pOInts lower, from a mean probablhty of 53% to 41%, (I e , 
In[53/(I -- 53)] - 19 x (In 11 - In I) = Inl 411(1 - 41)]) Similarly, 
the LNRELATE coeffiCIent of about - 26 suggests that an additIOnal 
10 years of bank-borrower relatiOnshIp could lower the probablhty of 
16 We eX.lmme thiS codetermm.ltton problem by .llso runmng ~ep.lratc collateral 
regressIOn"> on two wbseb ot the dat.l-Lle" With per~onal hdbIlIty ( ... orpor.ltlOns With 
a gUdrantee, ~ole propTietor<;hlp~, paJtnelshlp",) ver<;u.., those WIthout per~onaJ li.lbllltv 
(corporatIons Without a gUdfantee) The<;e .lddltlondlloglt regre<;<"IOn<> (not .,hown) .... ug-
ge<;t that OUf re<.,ults reported below generdllv hold for both of theo;e groups and dre 
robust 
17 In pnnclple, the prob(COLLAT) loglt regre"i';lOn could be c .... tlmdted Jomtly With 
the PREM OLS regre~~lOn lO d Seemmglv Unrelated Regre .... ~lon (SUR) model Under 
the a .. ~umed recursive model ..,tructurL, however, the en or term" of the .... e equatIOns ale 
not correlated dod <;0 there would bc no galO fl om Jomt estimation fhe fact that we 
found vlftuaUy no change ID the PREM rc .... ults when the COLLAT vdJlable<; were ddded 
to tho~e regr~"slons <,uggest<., thdt thl., dssumptlon I .... Ju~tJficd Moreover, even If the 
error term., were .,ubst.lnlTally correlated there would likely be httle gdm from Jomt 
estimation becduse the exogenou~ vafldble<; In both equdtlon.., dre the .. dille In almedr 
model, there 1<., no gam from JOlllt e .. tJrnatJ{)fi With .l common X mdtnx and expenments 
With nonhnear forms sugge .. t httle or no unpTOvemenf 'When nonhnedntlc .... , .... uch a<; the 
loglt form al e used 
18 fhe negdtlve effect of AGF l~ ... onSI~tent With the rcwIt~ of Scott and Smllh 
(1986) lhey did not however, have data on our RELATE vd.lldble 










TABLE 6 ProbabIlity Tests on Colldtera.l (AU Types) Lmes of Credit 
Log!t Regresslom. tor the Probablhty of COLLAT 
----
Total A<;"Iets Total As~eb 
All Flrm~ above $500,000 below >500,000 
(I) (2) 
Vafldble Coefficient I-Stdt,'>tlC Coetfk.lent l-Stdtl~tIC Coefficient 
I'ITERCEPT -26619" 34548 - 8259 4635 - 5 2428** 
LEv 1 0487** 4 1222 27432'"'* 52775 5373** 
PROF\lARG - 0437 1510 3182 6387 0631 
CCRRAT 0840 I 4998 1146 I 2018 0499 
QUlCKRAl - 0826 I 3837 - 0534 4707 - 0761 
ARfURN 0032' 16697 0022 8941 0057* 
INVTUR" - 0000 0141 - 00(]5 3926 0006 
A.PTURN - 0009 1 3639 - 0016 I 3922 - 0008 
Lt\TA 2065** 3 9951 0755 67 45 4043*'" 
CORP 0648 2963 - 5081 9407 1003 
SUBS 0292 1109 - 7411} 1 286tl 4021 
PART 3661 I 0662 - 9854 1 3097 7528* 
OWNMG 3426 1 4';A~ 5200* 16620 0317 
CONC50 0015 0100 - 2020 773~ 2556 
CONSTR - 2213 9767 - 7812*'" :::. 2g68 3732 
SERVICES 1954 8500 2002 4890 504J* 
RETAIL - 0295 1439 - 5794~ 1 8985 4229 
L'IAGE - 1942* I 8814 - 1321 QS75 - 2124 
LI\RELATE - ~635*'" J 1076 - 3880* < J 1959 - 1147 
]\cumber of 
obselvatlom, 861 437 
Dld.gnostlc~ 
- 2togL I 099024 509,16 
dl 18 18 
X" covarmtes 93 ,II 81 394 
--- -- -
NOIE -fhe t-~latlstJc~ m thiS table refer to the ~quMe roob ot the Wail! X's allJ <Ire compared to the cn1.lcdl vdlle~ for ~tudent'~ I dlstnbutlon 
¥ Stamtlcally slgmfkant at the IOfl level, two-tatled 
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collateral being pledged by about 16 pelcentage pomts from the mean 
of 53% to 37% Thus, firms WIth greatcr expenence and stronger bank-
borrower relatIOnshIps appear to pledge collateral much Ie" often than 
other firms, whIch IS cons"tent WIth Boot and Thakor (1994) and con-
ventIOnal WIsdom 
As above for the PREM regre"lOns, thc coefficleuts of the control 
vanables are gencrally stallsllcally Inslgmficant, although most of the 
coefficIents have the predIcted SIgns rhe "mulatlOn of an mcreasc In 
IIsk by moving all the financIal variables one standard deVIatIOn m the 
directIOn of greater risk InCleases the pledlcted probabilIty of collateral 
bemg pledged as expected, provIding some venficatlOn of the specIfi-
catIOn 
Columm 2 and 3 of table 6 show loglt regressIOns for prob(COL-
LAT) uSing the subsamples of firms above and below $500,000 III 
assets, respectively [he coefficIents of the mformatlOn/relatlonshlp 
vanables are agalll negallve and of economIcally mcanmgful magm-
tudes However, the AGE coeffiCIent In the assets-above-$500,000 re-
gressIOn and both the AGE and RELATE coetficlent> 10 the assets-
below-$500,OOO regressIOn are not statIStically Slgmficant ThIS may at 
least paJ tly reflect a loss of statlSlJcal test power III the smaller subsam-
pies As well, the explanatory power of the assets-bclow-$500,OOO re-
gresSIon IS consIderably lowcr, presumably reflecting a findlllg that the 
terms of bank lendIng to very small firms are qUIte IdIosyncratic to the 
owner-manager and are not well explamed by our firm-level economIc 
vanables SImIlar results obtulIled fOl the speCIficatIOn III the levels of 
AGE and RELATE (not shown) 
In table 7 the same loglt regreS>lOlls were run except that the depen-
dent vanable IS the probabllrty that the loan IS secUied by accounh 
receIvable and/or mventory (ARlNV) The dec",oll to pledge thIS type 
of collateral, whIch reqUires IIltenslve monrtonng by the bank, may 
have dIfferent motIvations than pledgIng other collateral 19 The results 
for the InfOrmallon/relatlOnshlp vanables In table 7 all have the same 
negallve sIgns as were observed III table 6, and the coefficIents are 
generally of economIcally slgmficant magmtudes, although LNAGE 
loses ItS stat"tlcal Slgmficance III the full sample In the speCIficatIOn 
WIth levels of AGE and RELATE (not shown), the results are sImIlar, 
except that AG E I, statIStIcally "gmficant for the full sample and for 
the assets-over-~500,OOO subsample 
Thu" the collateral findrngs generally Imply that the older a firm" 
and the longel Its bankrng relatIonshIp, the less often It WIll pledge 
collateral (although the AGE effect IS not always ;tatlStrcally slgmfi-
19 An altelndtive ~pecJi1catlOn would be to use d tnchotomou~ loglt With the chOices 
bemg ARINV OTHERSEC, and no colldter"ti Regre<,<;lOn<; run under thl'; alternative 
were not matenally different from those reported 




IABLE 7 Probablhty Tests on Collateral (4.ccount.!l ReceIvable and Inventory) Lmes of Credit 
LOglt Regre~~lons tor the Probablhty of ARINV 
----
Total A..,~et~ Total A~~eb 
All Flrm~ above $500 000 be low '1i500 000 
(II (2) 
Vanable CoefficIent I-StatistIc CoeffiCient {-StatIstic CoeffiCIent 
INfERCEPT - 5 0383" 59557 - 4 1130" 22J71 -84317x * 
LEV 5680"'''' 24784 2 1056""" 42758 2563 
PROH!ARG - 4051 12208 3110 6106 - 7795 
CURRAT 122';)""" 2 1115 0690 7622 167J" 
QLlCKRAT - 1374" 2 Ill? - 0747 6701 - 1489* 
ARrURN 0042** 2 1659 0041" 17725 0053 
INVTLRI': 0002 2417 - 0003 2973 ()()10 
APfURN - 0009 I 2565 - 0029"'''' 25628 0()()5 
L:STA 2909*" .) 2200 1988- 178i7 4691'-
CORP 692J" 2 6526 10707 15)55 'i532'" 
SLBS 28A5 9248 ::495 7635 4290 
PART 10166" 2 7201 0220 024') 16301 
OWNVlG 5818~~ 22669 4039 I 2)27 1 0326* 
COl\C50 - 0392 1985 - 210"'7 R221 0912 
COI\STR - 9110" J 3097 - 1 J344"" .3 5423 - 4014 
~ERVICES 1)545 2140 4,67 I '')''7 :,12 
REHIL 1678 7'8.27 - -\770 12431 0768'" 
L,AGE - 15 .. 4 ) 4':''''' ':'78 9')42 - :077 
L 'J"REv\TE - 257(f"'" .2 8h52 - ""84 .2 9911 - 1{)62 
\umber nt 
l)b·,etVd.tlnn~ [,63 437 
DldgnJ'>lK~ 
- 21o~L 974 [27 5()S ')66 
l\f 18 18 
X
2 cov< fld'e<; 145- 37(, 94 J08 
'lOll - Th ... , statlsttcs m lhl\ f"blt. refer 10 the ~qHdle rooh at the 'ovalo 'C\ dnd ~lre comp lrld to the cntKdl \ "dues lor SluJeni s t dl\lr,bunon 
~ <;'tdUSl!caHj sigruncam at thl lWIt I~v<!l tv. a-laded 
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cant) These results are consistent With Boot and Thakor (1994), who 
demonstrate that requmng collateral early m a relatlOnsh[p may be 
useful m solvmg a moral hazard plOblem The findmgs are also cons[s-
tent with convent[onal wisdom 10 banking As above for the PREM 
regreSSIOn rcsults the collateral findmgs suggest that mformatlOn 
about the firm [S revealed over lImc Young firms with new bankmg 
relatlOnsh[ps may be w[lImg to mcur the costs associated with collat-
eral because they know that pledgmg collateral attenuates the prob-
lems associated With asymmetnc mformatlOn Over t[mc, the firms are 
able to demonstrate some project success to the lender, who then 
reduces the collateral reqUIrements The prob(COLLAT) findmgs are 
also consistent with the PREM findmgs m that, m both cases, borrow-
ers with longer relallOnsh[ps receive easter tcrms from their banks-
lower rates and collateral [S less often reqUIred 
The data shown m tables 6 and 7 may also be used to mvesllgate 
the associatIOn between collateral and borrower nsk Borrower nsk 
should be d[stmgUlshed from loan fisk, which was mvest[gated above 
with the loan rate data Borrower fisk docs not melude the nsk-
reducmg effects of the pledged co\lateralnself In table 6, the leverage 
eoeffic[ent (LEV) [s positive and stallshca\ly s[gmficant m all three 
regressIOns, suggestmg that more leverage [S a"oclated with a higher 
probab[hty ofpledgmg collate[al S[m[larly, m table 7, the LEV coeffi-
c[ent [S positive m all three regres;[ons and stat[st[cally s[gmficantm all 
but the assets-below-$500,000 subsamp\e Th[s eVidence of a pOS[llve 
a5Soc[ahon between borrower fisk and the hkchhood of collateral be-
109 pledged [S consistent with eafher studies (Hester 1979, Berger and 
Udell 1990, 1992) 20 
V. ConclUSIOn 
OUI analys[s h[ghhghts the role of relallOnsh[p lendmg m commercial 
bank loan contractmg The eVidence md[cates that small firms With 
longer bankmg relat[onshlps borrow at lower rates and are less hkely 
to pledge collateral tban are other small firms These effects appear 
to be both economically and stat"tlcally s[gmficant The results are 
con'jl'jtent With the finanCIal mtcrmedlahon lIterature, whIch empha-
Sizes that banks produce pnvate mformatlOn about borrower quality 
(e g , Diamond 1984, 1991, Ramaknshnan and Thakor 1984, Boyd and 
Prescott 1986) Our empmeal results also suggest that banks accumu-
late Increasmg amounts of thl~ pnvate mformatlon over the duratIOn 
of the bank-bOl rower relatlOnsh[p and usc th" mformatlOn to refine 
20 Note, however, that the coefhclenb of the financml ratio'> other th,m LtV m 
tdble'> 6 and 7 dre generally "tahstlcally iO'ilgmficdot or fatl to hdve signs thdt consistently 
assoCiate collateral With either greater or le"ser borrower llsk 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved. 
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their iOdn contract term\ In dudltion, our findmg\ dH, con ... j.,tent with 
recent theoretIcal models of bank-bono we! relatlO~,hlps (Pekl ,en and 
Raj an 1993, Boot and Thakor 1994) although our resulh run counler 
to the predlclIons of other theoretIcal models (Greenbaum el al 1989, 
Sharpe 1990, WIlson 199,) ThIS does not sugge't th"t one set of theo-
nes IS true and the other IS false -I athel that, on net thc Petersen 
and Rajan and Boot and Thakor models dpptal to have stronger effect; 
on loan contract tcrms than do the other modeh 
Our analysIS attempts to extend two strands 01 the (mplfleal litera-
ture that bear on relatIOnshIp lendIng questIOns ~tudle' of bank 
umqueness found that the ex"tencc of" bank-boll ower leldtlOnshlp 
mcreases firm value, and that the strength of the reldtlonshlp-as mea-
sured by the d"tmctlOn between the announcerrents of Lie rcnewdls 
versus newly Issued Lies-often generates mdrkct value as well The 
umqueness literature re.,ults are often ('onsl"otent with the notion th(lt 
bank .. acqUIre valuable prIvate mformatlon over thr cour.;;c of theIr 
lelatlOnshlps WIth mostly large, publicly trdded firm> 
Our study dIffers from these UnIquene" slUdlC' 111 three ImpOI tant 
way~ First, we foeu.., on "mall, mo~tly ulltradcd film.;; lather thein on 
large publicly traded firm, Small firms are genelally more dependent 
on banks and arc more likely to have the type of dsymmetnc mforilla-
lIon problems that a hdnk-bOIrowcr relationshIp mdY I esolve Second, 
we use a contmuous measure of the strength of the bank-borrower 
relatIOnshIp, thdt IS, the length of lIme that the borrower h,,, conducted 
busme>s WIth lis current bank We believe that th" measure domInates 
the SImple bmomlal proxy of whethel the Lie was a renewal ve,"us a 
new ISSlle d~ d meal;)ure of the reJatJOo"hlP'.., ..,trength Thud, we are 
able to test directly the predictions of the le,ent lncoretlc,\1 Iiterdture 
about the path of loan mterest ratc.;; over the cour-:c of thL reldtlOn.;;hlp 
SImIlar to our andlysls, the ,econd strand of the cmpllIcdl lIterature 
on relatIonship lendmg foemed on small firms, used the contmuous 
length of the bank-borrowel relatlOn~hlp do;, ,t mc-aSUfC of 11\ .,trength, 
and tested the path of loan mtere,t rdtc, over the COllr'" of the relatlOn-
'hIp (Petersen and R'U.m 1993, 1994) However an Impm!ant dltter-
encc from our study IS that thl<" ~econd >;trand \.)f stmile>; did not (.onfine 
theJl1~elves to Lie IOdn:, Wc focus on hdnk Iinc,", of credit only, ex-
cludmg from OUI data ~et loan., thdt dre pnmanly tr dO\dctJOn-dnvcn, 
rdthcr than reldtIOn::-,hlp-dnvcn Our exclUSIOn of trdn~dctlOn-dnven 
loan.,-such .1\ mortgdges, cqUJpmcnt 10(Hl<;, motor vehIcle loan.;;, and 
other spot loans that ,mall firms often ohtaIn from multIple bonk ,--
may aVOId dliutmg our relationshIp lendmg re<;ult<; and fitly explain 
why our re'liits concernmg the pI iClIl!! at bank loan, dlfter trom thIS 
second strand of empmcal hter,lturc 
Our study also dIffers flOm both strdnds of the emplrIcdl I,klature 
m that It andlyzes the a"ocmltoo between the pledgmg ot collateral 
~~~"~,~~,_,,JC..JQ:lIp~y,!lJrig,gblJJt~©d.L20D1, All Rights Reseved, 
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and the bank-borrower relatIOnshIp The relatIonshIp lendmg model of 
Boot and Thakor (1994), as well as conventIonal wIsdom m bankmg, 
emphasIze the role of collateral m the evolutIon of the bank-borrower 
relatIOnshIp Our empIrIcal result that collateral IS less often pledged 
m a mature relatIOnshIp IS consIstent WIth the predIctIons of Boot and 
Thakor and conventIOnal WIsdom Our findmgs may .lIsa help clanfy 
some of the Issues m the collateral lIterature by controllmg for more 
types of collateral and more firm charactemtlcs than were preVIOusly 
aVaIlable The collateral findmgs are aha consIstent WIth the loan rate 
findlOgs-m both cases, borrowers WIth longer relatIOnshIp, receIve 
eaSIer loan tenns from theIr bdnks (lower rates, fewer collateral re-
qUIrements) 
Fmally, our findlOg thdt bank-borrower reldtIonshlps have value may 
have some polIcy ImplIcatIon, about the future of the bankmg mdustry 
FIrst, relatIOnshIp lendlOg may help lImIt the so-called "declIne of 
banklOg," m whIch seCUrItIzatIOn dnd nonbank competItIon are reduc-
109 the share of loans held by banks Our results suggest that the 
Impact of these trends on small busme'5 lendmg may be lImIted be-
Cduse of the value of relatIOnshIps aSSOCIated WIth bank lendlOg Sec-
ond, our results suggest that bank faIlures may create a loss of value 
m excess of the book value of the bank-the addItIonal loss of the 
relatIOnshIps Research on both the Great DepressIOn (Bernanke 1983) 
and a recent bank faIlure (SlovlO, Sushkd, and Polonchek 1993) verIfy 
these losses Lastly, bank faIlures may create "credIt crunches," or 
reductIons 10 the supply of credIt for small borrowers, wbo may face 
hIgher loan rates and more collateral reqUIrements If a bank WIth whIch 
they had an establIshed relatIonshIp faIls 
References 
Allen, L Sallndcr'>, A ,and Udell, G F 1991 The pncmg of retail depOSIts Concentra-
tion and mformdtlOn ]oUlnal of Flnan(laillltermedwtlOn 1 335-61 
Ang, J S 1992 On the theory of finance for pnvdtely held firms ]oUlna! of Small 
Buslne\\ Finance 1 185-203 
Avery, R B, and Berger A N 1991 Loan comtrutments and bank nsk expo~lIre 
Journal of Banking and Finance 15 (February) 173-92 
Berger, AN, and Udell, G F 1990 Collateral, loan quahty, and bank nsk Journal 
of Monetary EwnomlCS 25 (January) 21-42 
Berger, AN, and Udell, G F 1992 Some eVidence on the empmcal "Igmficance of 
credIt ratlonmg Journal of Pollt/wi Economy 100 (October) J047-77 
Bernanke B 1983 Non-monetary effed~ of the financtal cn"I'> 111 the propagatIOn of 
the Great DepreSSIOn Amencan E(OnOmIC ReVlel1 732'57-76 
Besanko D, dnd fhakor, A V 1987a Collateral and rdtlOmog Sortmg eqllihbna 10 
monopohstJc and competitive market" InternatIOnal ELonomlC Revlen 28671-89 
Bcsanko, 0 , and Thakor, A V 1987b Competitive eqUlhbnum m the credIt market 
under asymmetnc mformatIon Journal of ECOllomlC Theory 42 167-82 
Best R, and Zhang, H 1993 AlterndtlVe mformatton ,>ourl.e~ dod the lOformatlOll 
content of bdnk loans Journal of FlIlan(e 48 (September) 1507-22 
Bester, H 1985 Screenmg vs rattonmg III credtt market" With Imperfect mformdtlOn 
AmcJI(un EconomIC ReView 75 S'i0-55 
Co ri ht © 2001, All Rights Reseved, 
380 Inurn.1I of Bu~me'-'s 
BIllett, M ,";" Fldnnery 1\1 J ,dod Gdlfinkd J A 1995 .ll pre'>' fhe effect of lender 
Identity on d horrowmg hrm ~ eqUIty return JOdll/U' of Flf/ome 
Black J dod de Mezd, D 1992 Dlver510ndfV!,letlc" Why hMn<; to ~mdll hu,lOe,,~e~ 
are <;;0 ".ife Workmg pdpcr Exeter Umver<l1ty of Exeter 
Blackwell D W, dod Wmter", D B \944 Ihe heneflh of bankmg rcldtlOn.,hlp~ 
EVidence trom loan pncmg Workmg Pdper Iiouston Umver<;lty of Hou .. ton Juot'" 
Boot A W A and 1 hdkor, A V 1994 M.ordl hdLdrd and sewred lendmg In dO 
mhmlely rcpeated CRdlt mark.d g,lmc infprnaIJo{wl Lumon It Relll!H 1'i (Novem-
ber) 899 -920 
Boot, A W A Thdkor, A V , dod Udell, G F 1991 Sccurt.d lcndmg dnu default 
risk bqulhbnum <tndlY<'I<; and rollcy ImpllC,\11On, <md CmpJrlC;1\ re"u\t<, L((moml( 
JOIl/Hal lOt (Mdv) 4)8-72 
Booth, J R 1992 Contrdct w~b baok IOdo~ dnd the cro ,'>-ffiOnJtollog hypothe~I'> 
10U/l1al of Fman! wI C(Oflomu \ 31 2-41 
Booth J R 1991 Secured debt dod corpordte borrov"lng w'>t" \Vorh.ll1g paper Tempe 
An70na ')tdte Umverslty tebruarv 
Boyd, J dnd Pre"cott E ( 1986 FWdOUd! !OtCTmedl<'fY-COdIJtloo", lOll/lUll of /c.UI 
nomIC Theory 38211-12 
Carey, \1 PlOwse, S Rea J , dod Udell (J F 1991 Ihe economic .. ot private pldce-
menb A new look Fmanew{ MQlkCI\ In\flWt/Om {lnd In5fllllnenil 2 (Julv) \-67 
Chan Y -5 and K,mata'> G 1987 Colldtelrli dod competlllve eqUilibll<t With mOlal 
hazdrd dnd pnvdte mfOlffiation lournal of fln{[l/(c 42 34'i-64 
Diamond 0 W \984 FmaOChl.i mtclmedldtlOo and delegated mOOltonng Revieh 'Jf 
EconomJ( Stud/e\ 'il 393 -414 
Dldmood n W 1989 Reputation dcqIlJ"I-lon In di:bt n1ar:"eb lournal of PO/lfl( (ll 
Econonn 97 828-61 
Diamond, D W 1991 Momtonng <lnd reputatIOn The chOICe between b,.lnk loan" dnd 
directly pldced debt low nal of Polltu {II C( onO/f/\ 99 688-721 
Greenbaum, S i Kdndu.." G and VencZla J 19tN Equ\\Jbnum 10dO pncmg under 
the bank chent lcidtioo .. hlp joti/nal of Bankll,!? and hllam e 13 221-3~ 
Hc ... ter, D 1979 Customer rclatlOmhlp~ and term.., of IOdn ... l:.vldenct' from ,1 pliot 
... urvey ioU/nal of Mone} Credit and B(1l1hlI1R 11 149-';7 
Hoshi, T Ka<;hyap A, dnd Scharr..,tem D 1990(, B<lI1k momtonng <tr1d lOvestme-nt 
tVldence from the changmg ~tructurc of Jdpdne..,c cnrpOl.-1te bdokmg reldtlol1~hlp", 
In R G Hubbard (ed) A \}lnl'll'lll( InformatIOn Corporate Fmane ( and 1m ('Itnhnl 
Chicago Umver~lty of Chicago Pre')~ 
Ho ... hl T , Ka<;hydp, A and Scharf<;telO D 1990h 1 he role of bdnk~ In rcducrog tDe 
costs offinancldl dl<;trc'S<; III Japdn loU/nat of Fmaml{,1 bO!lOtrllCI 27 67-88 
Jame<; C 1987 Sorne eVidence on the uOlquenc<;s ot bdnk [o,ms jOllrnal of J Inane wI 
hunomu \ 19217-35 
Jame ... C, dod Wier P 1990 Borrovvlng rd.ltronshlp'" JOtermedutlon dnd the cost at 
I ...... umg puhhc ..,ecuntle~ Journal of FEntln( wi E.( onom/[.5 28 149-7 J 
Kwan S H 1994 The certlfkatJOo vdlue "t bdok loans Workmg pdpcr I llc~on lJlII-
verslty of AnZOOd Apnl 
Lllmmer 5 L aod McConnell J J 1989 f-<uI tiler eVlden.::c 00 the h mk le'1dmg proce~~ 
dod thc ,apltdl markd re~ponse to b<mk loan agreement<; IOlb fI(,1 of fEfI(m( 101 HI 11-
flOml( s 25 99-\22 
NakdJnurd, L I 1993 Commercldl bdnk mformdtlOo ImplICdtlon.., for the ..,trudurc 01 
bdnkmg In MH .• hael Kldu..,ncr ,md LnvreOCL J White (ed ... ) \lnH lum! Chal1f.;( !IJ 
BanI-IMp, Homewood 111 In\ In 
Orgler Y 1970 A "redlt "conng model tor commerudlltMn" jOlJlnaloJ \I/o/It'} (redlt 
and Banl.mg 2 43'i-4'i 
Pdcrsen M A and Rd1an R (J 1993 The effcd of lTt,(ht lII.1fkd competItIOn on 
firm-creditor reldtlOnshlp" Workmg pdpcr ChlC,lgO Umvcr<;lty of (,hlCdgO I ebru".ry 
Peter~cn M A, dnd RdJdO R G 1994 The bem_fib of nrm-credltt'r relat!on<;hlp.., 
.l::vldence rrom smdll bu"me:;,s d.ltd lOl/rnal of FII1(j/J( e 49 (March) 1-17 
RaJdn R G 1992 IO'>lders and outSIder" fhe chOice roetwccn lOformcd .mct .trm ... length 
debt lO/JI nal of f mon( c 47 (September) 1167- 1400 
Ramakn~ho<ln, S dod Ih..tkor, A V lY84 IntOlll1rltlon rclidbillt} dnd d theory of 
hOdnci3l mtermedlahon ReView of ccono/lll( .\/IIdJf\ 'il .115-12 
____ ~QPyright © 2001 AJJ Rights Resel/ed 
Relahonship Lendtng 381 
<icott, J A, and Smith T C 1986 The effect of the Bankluptcy RefOim Act of 1978 
on smdll bU"imes<; loan pnclng journal of FinancI(11 t(onomln 16 tl9~40 
Seiz, M 1994 SEA IS rolhng out revolvmg loans to ~mall compame"i Cdpltal-hungry 
firms Cdn draw on r..redlt lme" for recelvdble"i mventory Wall Street journal (Eastern 
ed ) (Mdrch Il) 
Sharpe, S A 1990 Asymmetnc mfor01.1tlon, bank lendmg, dnd Imphr..lt contrdcb A 
styhzed model of customer rclattomhlp'i journal oj f mlln( e 45 (September) 1069~87 
Shockley, R , dnd Thdkor, A V 1993 Informdtion content of commitments to lend In 
the future 1 heory dod eVidence on the g,un.., from relationship bankmg Workmg 
paper Bloommgton Ind13na Umvcr'ilty Jdnuary 
Slovm, M B ,John'ion, S A and Glascock I L 1992 firm "Ize dod the mformdtlOn 
content of bank loan announcement.., journal oj BanI-in/? and Finance 16 (December) 
1057-71 
SJovm, M B , Sushkd M b , dnd Polonchek J A 1993 The value ot bdnk durdhlhty 
Borrowers as bank stakeholder~ journal of finance 48 247-66 
Swary I, and Udell, G F 1988 InformdtlOn productIOn and the ~ecured lme afcredlt 
Workmg paper New York New York Umversity March 
Wdmley, J W • Eiayan FA, and Colhn ... M (' 1992 Investment opportumtle<; dod 
firm quality An emplflcdl IOvestlgatlOn of the mformatlOn In hank lme~ of credit 
Workmg paper UOlver"lty of I enne..,..,ee MdY 
Wil"ion P F 1993 The pnclOg of 10dno;, m d bank-hOllower relatIOnship Workmg pdper 
BlooIDlOgton Indland Umvel~lty, July 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reseved. 
